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IN THE SUPREME COURT
·of the
S~TATE

OF UTAH

RA-y l(EITH SUDBURY, and RUTfi
.J }~A.X SUDBURY,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

-vs.-

Case No.
9220

OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN, JR.,
and BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN,
Defendants .and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACT'S
Prior to June, 1958, Plaintiffs and Defendants were
partners, conducting a business known as "Ollie's Terrace Room" in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiffs acquired
their one-half (%) interest in that partnership from
Defendants by paying to Defendants the sum of $42,500.00 (Deposition Keith Sudbury, page 3, line 8).
In June, 1958, the parties agreed in writing for the
sale of Plaintiffs' partnership interest back to Defendants for the lesser sum of $31,608.41. A copy of that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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agree1nent, the subject of this suit, is attached to Plaintiffs' complaint as Exhibit "A." An unpaid contract balance of $25,408.41 was to be liquidated by Defendants
in weekly installments of $100.00 each, com1nencing
September 1, 1958, three 1nonths after the contract was
signed.
In addition to this first three month period without
payment, Defendants were accorded a cumulative fifteen
week grace period, from and after September 1, 1958
(Paragraph III C, Exhibit "A").
The provisions of the contract pertaining to security
and default are of prime importance to the ease and
provide as follows:
"SECURITY FOR PERFORMANCE:

v.
That it is agreed that as security for performance of the payment of money herein specified
to be made to SELLERS that BUYERS shall
execute a blanket chattel1nortgage upon all equipment and tenants' improvements in and upon
those premises that have been used for the conduct of the Limited Partnership herein referred
to, which mortgage it is understood and agreed
shall be considered a second mortgage as to the
mortgage that BUYERS presently contemplate
entering into to obtain financing of said business;
that it is understood and agreed that the equipment and fixtures to be 1nortgaged to SELLERS
under the terms of this agreement may be traded
or replaced by BUYERS without first obtaining
consent of SELLERS, provided that none of such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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equip1nent is disposed of by BUYERS for the
sole purpose of raising capital or satisfying
creditors.
DEFAULT:

VI.
That it is agreed that in the event of BUYERS' failure to pay to SELLERS the sums due
then1 under the terms of this agreement that
SELLERS n1ay, at their option, elect to proceed
in either one or the other of the following designated manners:

A. }r!ORTGAGE FORECLOSURE: SELLERS rnay, at their option, declare the \vhole of the
unpaid balance under the tenns of this agreen1ent
at once due and payable and proceed to collect
same and foreclose their security herein given,
it being understood and agreed in such event,
ho\vever, that SELLERS shall have no rights
against BUYERS beyond BUYERS' assets that
may be represented by the furniture, fixtures, tenants' improvements, and leases up·on the premises
herein referred to, and it is agreed that in the
event of election to foreclose as in this paragraph
stated, SELLERS may sell any of said property
at public or private sale and retain the full proceeds thereof as their own in discharge of any
remaining obligation of BUYERS to SELLERS.

B. FORFEITURE: SELLERS, alternative
to foreclosure as above specified, may take all of
BUYERS' right, title and interest in and to said
business contemplated by the terms of this agreement to the full exclusion of all right, title and
interest of BUYERS in and to any of said property and the business represented thereby in full
discharge of any remaining obligations, and in
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such event SELLERS may hold same as their own
and operate said business in the manner that they
rnay deem desirable, being responsible, nevertheless, to the creditors of BUYERS as said creditors' rights may appear as provided by law.
That as an express and integral part of the
consideration of the terms of this agreement, and
in consideration of SELLERS' consenting that
BUYERS' assets shall not be amenable to process
by SELLERS in the event of default by BUYERS, that BUYERS hereby covenant and agree
that in the event of default and an election by
SELLEI{S to proceed under the terms of the foregoing forfeiture provision that BUYERS will
never raise nor assert as a defense to any such
action defense of forfeiture, and they hereby expressly waive and covenant not to claim as their
own any rights in any of said property nor rights
to refunds of any moneys that may be paid under
the terms of this agreement, and BUYERS covenant that they will not sue upon theory of forfeiture nor assert said theory either by way of
counterclaim, affirmative defense or offset in any
action that may be brought by any of the parties
to this agreement; that each party to tlris agreement understands that Courts do not favor forfeitures, but that each party consents that an indispensable part of the consideration for the
terms of this agreement is that BUYERS covenant not to sue or defend upon the theory of forfeiture and they do hereby expressly ·w. aive and
consent not to assert such right.''
At the time the agreement between the parties was
negotiated, the provisions quoted above were specifically
and fully discussed by Keith Sudbury, one of the Plain-
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5
tiffs, and 'rheodore Olaf Stevenson, one of the Defendants ( J)eposition l(eith Sudbury, page 38, line 30 through
page -t-1, line 15). No chatteln1ortgage was ever executed.
No paYJnent was made on the contract by Defendants
until payrnent of $300.00 on December 8, 1958, which was
at the end of the fifteen weeks grace period. The $300.00
\Vas for the payments that were due Septernber 1, 8 and
15, 1958.
On January 2, 1959, Defendants paid $1,000.00 for
payments due for September 22, 1958 through November
24, 1958 inclusive. No other payments "\vere 1nade until
l\larch 16, 1959; thereafter all payn1ents were made fifteen "\veeks after their due dates and on the last day of
the fifteen weeks grace period (Ex. P-3).
On August 10, 1959, Defendants gave Plaintiffs two
checks in the amounts of $100.00 and $200.00 respectively.
The $200.00 check was for payments due April 20, and
27, 1959. The $100.00 check, postdated to August 17,
1959, was for the installment due l\1ay 4, 1959.
Both of those checks were dishonored by Defendants'
bank. Because of the refusal to honor the checks, Defendants were then delinquent a total of eighteen payments totalling $1,800.00.
Plaintiffs gave Defendants written notice on August
17, 1959 that they would accept no further installment
payments and were accelerating the payments. Defendants were told that there was a balance due Plaintiffs of
$23,506.51 which Plaintiffs would expect a short time
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after Defendants returned from Europe so that it 'vould
not he necessary for Plaintiffs to foreclose Defendants
equipment or take over the business (Exhibit P_-4).
Thereafter on September 1, 1959, Defendants attempted to pay $500.00, purportedly tn bring the contract payments current. That sum was refused by Plaintiffs and this lawsuit resulted (Exhibit P -5).
Defendants filed no ans\ver in the case. The case
'vas heard by the trial court on motions for summary
judgment. Defendants we-re granted su1nmary judgment
against Plaintiffs, and this ap·peal results.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT 'THAT DEFENDANTS WERE NOT IN DEFAULT
UNDER THE CONTRACT, AND THAT THE CONTRACT
WAS VALID AND SUBSISTING IS ·CONTRARY 'TO THE
EVIDENCE WHICH IS UNCONTRADICTED THAT DEFENDANTS WERE DELINQUENT A TOTAL OF EIGHTEEN
PAYMEN'TS.
POINT TWO
THE JUDGMENT, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF
T·HE TRIAL CO·URT ENTIRELY IGNORES THE COVENAN'T OF DEFENDANTS NOIT TO SUE NOR DEFEND ON
THE GR.OUND OF FORFEITURE.
POINT THREE
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
FORFEITURE P·RO·VISION OF THE ·CONTRA·CT IS UNENF·OR.CEABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW IS ERRONEOUS.
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POIN'T FOUR
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ACCELERATE 'THE
CON'TRACT BALANCE AND THAT DEFENDANTS MADE
A VALID 'TENDER ARE IMMATERIAL AND CONTRARY
TO THE EVIDENCE.
POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING AND
ENTERING FINDINGS OF FACT TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSIONS O·F LAW AND JUDGMENT.

ARGlT1\fENT
POINT ONE
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT 'THAT DE·FENDANTS WERE NOT IN DEFAULT
UNDER THE CONTRACT, AND THAT THE CONTRACT
WAS VALID AND SUBSISTING IS ·CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE WHI•CH IS UNCONTRADICTED THAT DEFENDANTS WERE DELINQUENT A TOTAL OF EIGHTEEN
P AYl\'IEN'TS.

Although the record in this matter gives little solace
to one attempting to ascertain how the trial court reached
the conclusions it did, certain elements stand out as
guideposts.
A complaint was filed praying for a declaration of a
forfeiture of Defendants rights in the agreement and the
assets described therein. No ans"\ver was filed by Defendants, but Defendants' motion for summary judgment casts son1e light upon their position. They prayed
for summary judgment on the basis that the contract
was valid and subsisting and that Defendants were not
in default thereunder (R. 19).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
An affidavit of one of Defendants sets forth some
of the 1naterial one 'vould expect to find in an answer.
These are (1) a denial that Defendants had exhausted
the fifteen weeks grace period, and ( 2) denial that Defendants failed to make the payments that became due
on August lOth and 17th, 1959. Apart from these two
points, Defendants requested a trial to put in evidence
on other points of the case (R. 21).
The findings and conclusions of the trial court go
far afield from the points raised by Defendants' motion,
but in part find that there was no default and that the
contract was valid and subsisting. This was erroneous
based upon the uncontradicted evidence before the trial
court, and "varrants a reversal of the order of the trial
court granting Defendants' motion for summary judglnent.
The contract is clear that the $100.00 weekly paynlents were to commence the 1st day of September, 1958.
Defendants were accorded a cumulative fifteen weeks
grace period. It is apparent that the Defendants elected
to take immediate advantage of the fifteen "Teeks grace
period, because no payments vvere made from the time
of execution of the contract in June, 1958, until the 8th
day of Dece1nber, 1958. Then the sum of $300.00 was
pajd for the paYinents due September 1, 8 and 15, 1958.
A glance at the calendar and use of simple arithmetic
will establish that all payments thereafter ''"'ere fifteen
weeks delinquent, to the end of the accorded grace p·eriod
(Ex. P-3). The last payment was made on July 27, 1959,
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and \Yas for the installment due April13, 1959.
The evidence is uncontradicted that the checks given
on August 10, 1959, for pay1nents due April 20 and 27,
1959, and ~Iay 4, 1959, were refused and dishonored by
Defendants' bank (Ex. P-1; Ex. P-2; Deposition of l{eith
Sudbury, Pages 10-17).
The record is barren of contradiction that Defendants were then in arrears eighteen payments totalling
$1,800.00, and were therefore in default.
Before any further payments were tendered by Defendants, Plaintiffs delivered written notice of default
(Ex. P-4).
The ruling of the trial court that the contract was
valid and subsisting and that Defendants were not in
default is contrary to all of the evidence and is erroneous.
POINT TWO
THE JUDGMENT, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF
THE TRIAL COURT ENTIRELY IGNORES THE COVENANT OF DEFENDANTS NOT TO SUE NOR DEFEND ON
THE GROUND OF FORFEITURE.

The trial court in its summary judgment determined
that the forfeiture provision was unenforceable. In order
to do this, it ignored what the parties declared to be
an "indispensable'' part of the consideration for the
agreement: an express covenant not to sue nor raise
the defense of forfeiture.
The contact provides:
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"* * * in consideration of sellers' consenting
that buyers' assets shall not be a1nenable to process by sellers in the event of default by buyers
that buyers hereby covenant and agree that jn
the event of default and an election by sellers
to proceed under the terms of the foregoing forfeiture provision that buyers \vill never raise nor
assert as a defense to any such action the defense
of forfeiture, and they hereby expressly waive
and covenant not to claim as their own any rights
in any of said property * * * ; that each party to
this agreement understands that Courts do not
favor forfeitures, but that each party consents
that an indispensable part of the consideration
for the terms of this agreement is that buyers
covenant not to sue or defend upon the theory of
forfeiture and they do hereby expressly waive
and consent not to assert such right."
A covenant not to sue is universally recognized and
uniformly enforced. 45 A1n. Jur., Release, Section 3.
The Restatement of the Lavv of ·Contracts phrases
the rule as follows :
"Section 405.

CONTRACT NOT TO SUE.

"(1) A contract by which one party promises never to· sue the other party, or a third person
for the enforcement of a specific right, or not to
do so for a limited time, bars an action for that
purpose during any agreed time * * *"

The enforceability of a covenant not to sue is tested
by the same standards as are determinative for any
other type of contract. If the ele1nents of an enforceable
contract are found to be present in a covenant not to
sue, the covenant not to sue is enforceable.
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In this case \Ve have t\vo parties, eo1npetent to
eontract, "·ho in clear and explicit terins, contracted with
regard to a subject matter as to "Thich they \vere free
to contract. The 1nutual assent of both is clear from
the language used. There \vas an independent consideration given by Plaintiffs for Defendants' promise not to
raise the defense of forfeiture. There is no tinge of
illegality or in1position involved in their agree1nent. The
covenant not to sue thus meets all the requisites for the
forElation of a valid and enforceable contract. 12 Am .
.T ur. p. 509, ·Contracts, Section 16.
The rights of the parties \Vhich \vere exchanged in
connection with the covenant not to sue certainly represent a fair exchange of values. Plaintiffs gave up the
very valuable right to look to the personal assets of
Defendants for the enforcement of Defendants' promise
to pay the agreed purchase price for the business. Defendants, with full kno\vledge that courts disfavor forfeitures agreed not to invoke this attitude of the Courts
if Plaintiffs had need to enforce the forfeiture provision.
By giving effect to the covenant not to sue, as the
trial court should properly have done, it only remained
for the court to consider whether or not there had been
a default in the prescribed payments and an election
by Plaintiffs to proceed under the forfeiture provision.
As discussed above in Point I, there can be no
question that Defendants were in default in their payments. Further Plaintiffs notified Defendants on August
17, 1959 that they would accept no further installment
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pay1nents, and demanded payn1ent of the full balance
due under the contract (Exh. P-4). When Defendants
did not pay the balance by September 11, 1959, Plaintiffs
notified Defendants that they were electing to pursue
the forfeiture provision unless full payment was n1ade
within 30 days thereafter (Exh. P-5). When the contract
balance was not paid by November 10, 1959, this suit
'vas commenced for declaration of the forfeiture. This
clearly manifests an election by Plaintiffs of the remedy
they were pursuing.
The trial court's complete disregard of the covenant
not to sue clearly invades a very sacred right of human
endeavor -

the freedom and right to contract.

The right of private contract is no small part of
liberty of citizens, and the function of the courts is to
maintain and enforce contracts rather than enable parties
to escape their obligations.
That principle is repeatedly announced by the courts.
12 Am. J ur., Contracts, Section 172; McCallum v.
Campbell-S~mpson

Motor Company, Idaho 1960, 349 P.
2nd 986; J. R. Simplot Company v. Chambers, Idaho

1960, 350 P 2nd 211.
It is respectfully urged that the judgment of trial
court in derogation of the express terms of the contract
not to sue or defend was erroneous and should be reversed.
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POINT THREE
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
FORFEITURE PROVISION OF THE ·CONTRACT IS UNENFORCEABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW IS ERRONEOUS.

Appellants believe the covenant not to sue or defend
on the ground of forfeiture prevents Defendants from
defending that the forfeiture provision of the agreement
is not enforceable.
IIowever, even without the covenant not to sue, the
forfeiture provision itself, when viewed in the light of
all the circumstances of the case, is the only effective
remedy which Plaintiffs have under the contract, and
the court therefore erred in summarily ruling as a matter
of law that it was uneforceable.
19 Am. J ur., 102, Equity, Section 93, sets out the law
respecting enforcement of forfeitures as follows:
"While the law does not favor forfeitures,
and since all ambiguities in a contract are to be resolved against their existence, it is not to be supposed that a court of equity will lightly dispense
with contracts made between competent parties
and substitute therefor other agreements more in
accordance with variable rules of right and conscience, thus preventing them from having that
which was made by them the very e·ssence of their
agreement. Courts in general have not gone so
far as to hold that equity can relieve from the
consequences of the breach of a condition whenever it stands as security for the performance of
some act. Forfeitures are not p·er se unlawful,
and if a contract in unmistakable terms p,rovides
for .a forfeiture, is otherwise free from legal inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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firnuty, and the act secured against is of the
essence of the contract, neither a court of equity
nor a court of law will relieve against the forfeiture.''
In the case of Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P.
2d 623, this court said:
"In the absence of fraud or imposition, the
parties are bound by the price or measure of value
they have agreed on, and such p·rice must be paid
notwithstanding it may be excessive. The courts
cannot supervise decisions made in the business
world and grant relief when the bargain proves
improvident.''
In the case of Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 P. 2d
712, the court further ackno,vledged the right of persons
to contract freely, stating at page 717:
"It is not our prerogative to step in and renegotiate the contract of the parties. It may he
conceded that with an advantaged background ,,~e
may be able to improve on their work and considering the changed times and conditions say
what now appears to us to be fair under such
conditions. Possibly at least one of the parties
would agree. There is no reason why we should
consider the vendee privileged and entitled to our
intervention unless the conditions sought to be
imposed on the vendee are unconscionable. Equity
should not indulge in refinements and exact valuations at a time subsequent to the breach or recission, further than to determine if enforcement
of the contract results in gross inequity, and unless and until the enforce1nent would be highly
unconscionable, we should recognize and honor
the right of persons to contract freely and to
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1nake real and genuine Inistakes '''"hen the dealings are at arms' length. It will be conceded, "\Ve
think, that where a seller seeks not only his pound
of flesh but likewise a goodly supply of blood he
should not be indulged.
Nor should we fail to observe how many purchasers have made most advantageous bargains
and when the contracts have run have secured
property three times what the poor sellers received under their contracts. Should not equity,
if we are going paternalistic, under the same
tokens say to such a buyer, You can't do this to
the poor seller-the property to which he still
holds title is now worth two or three times what
you are paying him and that is unconscionable;
you will be required to pay more than the contract
calls for in order that he be· not required to give
a deed to property worth three times what he is
being paid."
By application of the foregoing pronouncements to
the case at bar, we, also, find a situation in which the
forfeiture provision should be enforceable.
We have parties standing on equal footing and dealing at arms' length. There is no fiduciary relationship
between them. Neither is under disability. There is no
suggestion or claim of fraud in the inducement or execution of the agreement. The business experience of each
had been a common one.
The parties parted. They agreed that Defendants
should purchase Plaintiffs' interest. The sale was of an
interest in a going business, but there were certain tangible assets to which Defendants needed unencumbered
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
title in order to borrow money to continue the business.
The agreement, therefore, constituted a present conveyance of all tangible assets.
Because Defendants desired to borrow money on the
business assets and were unwilling to make an unqualified promise to pay the purchase price, the contract, of
necessity, assumed some unique characteristics as compared to an ordinary sales contract.
Thus, at Defendants' insistence, the following provisions came into the agreement:
(a). Title to all of the assets of the business
passed immediately to Defendants;
(b). Plaintiffs were to have a chattel mortgage
as security for the agreed purchase price; however,
the chattel mortgage was expressly subordinated to
additional financing arrangements, unlimited 1n
amount, which Defendants might later desire to
make (R. 7).
(c). Defendants had the absolute and untrammeled right to trade or substitute chattels without Plaintiffs' consent (R. 7);
(d). Defendants' promise to pay the purchase
p·rice was enforceable only against business assets,
with personal liability against Defendants having
been expressly waived by Plaintiffs (R. 8);
(e). Defendants were not required to make
any payment whatever for three months after the
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contract \vas signed. In addition, Defendants were
given a fifteen week grace period for making payments (R. 6).
The agreement spelled out two alternative remedies
for Plaintiffs in event of Defendants' default. The first
"~as the right to declare the full amount of the purchase
price due and proceed to foreclose on the mortgage. The
second was the right to declare forfeiture of the business
to Plaintiffs, subject to the obligation and duty of Plaintiffs to pay all creditors of Defendants, (R. 8-9), \vhich,
implicitly, would forestall the creditors of Defendants
fro1n enforcing their presumed right to deficiency judgments against Defendants. Either of these remedies were
made available, at Plaintiffs' option.
Since Defendants were permitted to borrow undetermined and unlimited amounts from others, using the
chattels as security, with Plaintiffs' rights being subordinated to any such financing, the security of a chattel
mortgage on the physical assets of the business immediately became illusory and of no benefit whatever in protecting Plaintiffs' right to receive the promised pTice.
Resort to an example will graphically illustrate the
fairness of the forfeiture provision. As stated, Defendants had total power to encumber the property, coupled
with an entire absence of personal responsibility for any
deficiency. Thus, if Defendants were to borrow the full
resale value of the assets, as can be done, and Defendants
then defaulted, Plaintiffs could recoveT nothing by way
of mortgage foreclosure. They would get nothing since
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there can be no personal judgment against Defendants
under this contract. In such a situation the ability to
take over a going business would give plaintiffs a chance
to salvage their investment. This could only be accon1plished by resort to the forfeiture provision.
Obviously, "\vithout full efficacy being given to the
forfeiture provision as "\vritten, Plaintiffs are without
any security whatsoever.
Is it then unconscionable for Plaintiffs to declare a
forfeiture of the business, take it back and operate it in
an atte1npt to pay off any secured or other business creditors that Defendants Inay have, and if they succeed in
this, thereafter attempt to recoup their money~
The trial court ruled that such a forfeiture is void as
a matter of law. Significantly, it so ruled 'vhen there
'vas no evidence "\vhatever that total encumbrance in
favor of other creditors 'vas not the precise status of the
business at the time forfeiture vvas declared.
If such were the fact, and there is no evidence other'vise, the court took from Plaintiffs the entire balance of
the purchase price, less 'vhatever sum the conscience of
Defendants dictates they should pay to Plaintiffs.
In addition to the language of the contract that the
forfeiture provision is indispensable, the above analysis
of the operation of the contract demonstrates that the
forfeiture provision is the total essence thereof. There
is not another element of the entire contract upon which
protection to Plaintiffs is more dependent.
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The action of the trial court not only eliminated the
freedon1 of these parties to contract, but it re,vrites their
entire agreement, giving all to a defaulting buyer, giving
nothing to an unsecured seller.
The trial court's gratuitious ''revision" is more
unconscionable with respect to the rights of the seller
than the Inost drastic forfeiture provisons could ever be.
If the trial court is to be permitted to rewrite the
contract, deleting provisions inserted by the parties for
valuable consideration, and of the utmost importance
to each at the time of execution, it should also be required to give back the considerations relinquished In
exchange for the deleted and ignored provisions.
It should be obliged to insert a provision granting
Plaintiffs the right to deficiency judgment.
It should p-rohibit Defendants from encumbering or
disposing of the physical assets of the business at will
and compel Defendants to remove those encumbrances.
And to logically proceed, it should be comp·elled
to prevent Plaintiffs sustaining a loss on the sale, by
requiring Defendants to pay back to Plaintiffs their
full original investment of $42,500.00, not merely the
$36,200.00 agreed upon.
It is obvious that if the trial court had rewritten
the contract to so assist sellers, this court would not
pause for a moment in blue penciling such additions.
As has been aptly stated in the Utah case of Peck
vs. Judd, supra, courts refuse to interfere with advan-
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tageous bargains made by purchasers. The doctrine of
mutuality of contract dictates and demands that the
same p·rescription be applied against interference with
the rights of sellers.
Note should be taken of the attitude of Defendants
with respect to this agreement. Having been given three
months before any payments were required of them, and
an additional fifteen week grace period during the life
of the contract, Defendants consciously and callously
elected to exhaust the entire grace period during the
first months of the contract, thereby courting peril and
flirting with forfeiture. They should not now be heard
to complain.
Defendants urge, the most literal interpretation of
the contract, insofar as that could result in benefit to
themselves; but they urge the court to completely ignore
the contract in those respects where a benefit may inure
to Plaintiffs.
Evidence of this fact is the tender of money Defendants made in court. Ostensibly, this ·w. as to bring the
contract current. Actually, these tenders \Vould bring
the contract back to the point of not being in default;
but continuing the fifteen week grace period exhausted.
It is submitted that it is not conscionable that Defendants be permitted to put Plaintiffs in a position
where they are obliged to pay their obligation only out
of the assets of the business, which assets can be \Yholly
removed from Plaintiffs' reach by Defendants, and in
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a cavalier Inanner, fail to make eighteen instalhnent payments, give Plaintiffs two bad checks, leave the country
for Europe, and then complain that the covenant given
for ample and valuable consideration, not to sue nor
raise the defense of forfeiture in event of default should
not be enforced.
Finally, it should be noted that since the notice of
default was given to Defendants, Plaintiffs have nevertheless been vvilling to accept the full contract balance
due them in the sum of $23,500.00 together with interest
to date (Exh. P-4; P-5). That was and is a courtesy
extended by Plaintiffs which was not required of them.
It demonstrates that Plaintiffs have at all times acted
in good faith vvith regard to the obligation. The election
of Plaintiffs to forfeit this contract is not an attempt
to take undue advantage of Defendants, but as demonstrated above, it represents the only effective remedy
Plaintiffs could ever pursue to protect their rights
under the contract.
The trial court's ruling that forfeiture is an unenforceable remedy effectively destroys any contract right
\vhich Plaintiffs had, and was error.
POINT FOUR
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ACCELERATE THE
CONTRACT BALANCE AND THAT DEFENDANTS MADE
A VALID TENDER ARE IMMATERIAL AND CONTRARY
TO THE EVIDENCE.
1
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poses of foreclosure. In good faith, and as an unrequired
courtesy, they merely extended to Defendants an opportunity to pay in full to avoid forfeiture (Exh. P-5 ).
If it is claimed that Plaintiffs were required to
accelerate for purposes of forfeiture, they have done so
(Exh. P-4 and P-5).
POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING AND
ENTERING FINDINGS OF FACT T·o SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT.

Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
1nakes it n1andatory that in all actions tried without
jury, the court must find specifically, as well as separately, the facts which constitute ground for decision
(53 Am. J ur. Trials, Section 1133).
The findings contain statements to the effect that
this agree1nent "\vas a chattel mortgage, not a conditional
sales contract, 'vhich findings are actually conclusions
of law unsupported by any evidence or findings of fact.
The findings state that Defendants were not in default. The finding is wholly unsupported by the evide~ce,
and in fact is a conclusion of la"~, barren of the requisite
base of evidence.
There is nothing In the findings authorizing the
conclusion that the forfeiture provision of the contract
should not he enforced. There is no finding of fraud.
None of imposition. None of gross inequity. None of
unconscionable advantage nor injury to the public.
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The judgrnent of the trial court that the forfeiture
provision of the contract is unforceable is unsupported
by any finding, and is consequently erroneous.
CONCLUSION
Intelligent parties dealt at ar1ns' length. One said
''I will buy your interest in your business if, but only if,
you will agree that I may pay you from the proceeds
of that business. If I do not pay you as I now agree
to do, you may look to that business only for your
money, not to me."
The other party, knowing of his great risk and
hazard, consented, but stated: "I agree. But because
of that concession to you, you must agree that if you
don't pay me, you will give me back my interest and
g1ve me your own interest as well." The other party
agreed.
These contractually competent people then discussed
a method whereby they could make known their desires
that they be permitted by the courts to contract and
agree in the way that they both conceded was fair.
One of them gave away a valuable pToperty right,
to wit, the substantive entitlement to security and deficiency. In exchange, the other party promised that if
he did not pay that he would then give the entire
operation back, subject, however to all the debt.s he
might in the future incur in his attempts to operate
the business.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
Both of these people desired the arrangement. They
both knew that if a dispute should arise, the person
who agreed to give back what he had acquired, plus his
own interest, would then have available to him the possible defense that courts abhor and sometimes do not enforce forfeitures.
Knowing that, they then, within the limitations imposed by language as expressive of intent, framed words
that say:
"We are now in agreement. We do not know which
of us made a bad bargain or a good bargain. Retrospection, only, will tell us. But, if \Ve ever get in the
courts on this, our agreement, we both desire that the
court that may then judge us will know that we desire
to be judged on our state of minds existing on the day
we drew our agreement.
"That is, both being fair, we know that forfeitures
are not favored. We will spell that out for one purpose
-so that the courts, if need be, \vill have the good sense,
with clear conscience, to recognize our capacities and
intentions and give credit to our integrity by enforcing
our agreement in accord with our desires as we have
expressed them and which we now agree are fair."
The covenant not to assert as a defense the precept
of forfeiture should be enforced.
Were the shoe on the other foot, would Plaintiffs
be heard to complain that Defendants offended the public and this court by making Plaintiffs "\\ aive rights to
7
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deficiency~

Of course not. That position is ridiculous.
To deny Plaintiffs forfeiture would be to offend
conscience, destroy mutuality and make a mockery of
freedom of contract.
The judgment of the trial court on Defendants
motion for summary judgment should be reversed, and
the case remanded with directions to enter judgment
for plaintiffs on their complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
BRIDWELL, REYNOLDS &
·CUTHBERT
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Appellants

506 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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